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1967; Fishburn, 1982). This has, among others, implications for 
the identification of neural utility representations which often 
relies on the derivation of utility functions from revealed prefer-
ences (Kalenscher et al., 2005; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 
2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; 
Heldmann et al., 2009).
Yet, despite its importance for the neurobiological investigation 
of decision-making, remarkably little is known about the neural 
mechanisms underlying intransitive choice. For example, while it 
has been previously shown that choice-underlying subjective values 
are represented in, among others, ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), posterior pari-
etal cortex (PPC) and striatum (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue 
et al., 2004; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 
2007; Plassmann et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007, 2009; Kim et al., 
2008; Rangel et al., 2008), it is unknown whether these structures 
are also recruited during intransitive decision-making, and whether 
neural value representations are intransitive. Furthermore, intran-
sitive choices may be the consequence of particular mental rules 
people use to make decisions, but very little is known about the 
neural implementation of such decision rules (Volz et al., 2006; 
Venkatraman et al., 2009).
Here, we investigated neural activity related to intransitive 
choices  during  decision-making  under  risk.  Participants  fre-
quently made intransitive decisions when choosing between pairs 
of gambles varying in gain magnitude and probability. Intransitive 
choices occurred because the desirability (subjective value) of a 
given option was not assessed independently, but depended on 
INTRODUCTION
It is often assumed that decisions are made by rank-ordering the 
available choice alternatives according to their subjective desirabil-
ities, and then selecting the most desirable alternative (Bernoulli, 
1954; Shizgal, 1997; Montague and Berns, 2002). Because one alter-
native cannot be at the same time better and worse than another 
alternative, choices should satisfy transitivity (Samuelson, 1938; 
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Transitivity holds that, if 
choice alternative A is preferred over B, and B is preferred over 
C, then A should also be preferred over C. Transitivity is not just 
an intuitively compelling rule; it is a cornerstone of many deci-
sion theories, and a hallmark of rational action in economics 
(Samuelson, 1938; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Afriat, 
1967; Varian, 1982), philosophy (Hume et al., 1978) and biol-
ogy (Stephens and Krebs, 1986). Intriguingly, despite its intuitive 
appeal, humans and animals often violate transitivity (Tversky, 
1969; Navarick and Fantino, 1972; Loomes et al., 1991; Shafir, 
1994; Roelofsma and Read, 2000; Waite, 2001; Lee et al., 2006, 
2009). Intransitive choices can occur when individuals choose 
between outcomes that vary along several dimensions, for exam-
ple, monetary gain magnitude and probability (Tversky, 1969), or 
magnitude and delay (Roelofsma and Read, 2000).
Violations of transitivity are important for our understanding 
of decision-making. If an agent systematically fails to make con-
sistent, transitive choices, a utility function capturing the options’ 
subjective desirabilities cannot straightforwardly be constructed 
from  observable  choices  without  making  further  assumptions 
(Samuelson, 1938; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Afriat, 
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the alternative option a gamble was combined with (e.g., gamble 
A may be more desirable when combined with gamble B than 
with gamble C). We found evidence that traditional decision-
areas, such as DLPFC, VMPFC, PPC and striatum, represented 
the local, intransitive desirability of the gambles at stake. We fur-
ther found that the intransitive evaluation of the gambles was 
mediated by specific rules participants used for decision-making 
under risk. More specifically, fluctuations in the gambles’ values 
were the consequence of variable preferences for richer or safer 
gambles, which were supported by distinct neural mechanisms in 
areas known to be sensitive to reward magnitude and risk attitude 
during multi-attribute choice, such as insula (Wittmann et al., 
2007; Smith et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2009) and posterior cingulate 
(McCoy and Platt, 2005).
MaTeRIals aND MeThODs
PaRTICIPaNTs
A total of 31 participants (18 females, mean age 22.8 years, range 
18–28 years) recruited from the University of Amsterdam partici-
pated in this experiment. All participants were right-handed and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision in the scanner. Subjects 
were screened to ensure they satisfied magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI) safety requirements and to exclude those with a prior 
history  of  neurological  or  psychiatric  illness.  They  were  paid 
between €25 and €30 for participation, depending how much 
they won during the task. Participants gave their informed con-
sent and the study was approved by the Academic Medical Center 
Medical Ethical Committee. Four subjects (two females) had to be 
excluded from the analysis because of excessive head movement 
inside the scanner.
INsTRUCTIONs
Prior to scanning, subjects were informed that they would be reim-
bursed with €25 for their participation, but that they could add up 
to €5 to this sum depending on whether they win in this game or 
not. They were instructed that they were playing for dummy dollars, 
and the final gain in Euro would be determined by dividing the won 
sum of dummy dollars by 100. No losses were possible, and in case 
of a no-win, nothing would be added to the default imbursement 
of €25. Subjects were further instructed that, during the task, they 
would not receive feedback about the success or failure of their cho-
sen gamble, but that, at the end of the experiment, one trial would 
be selected at random by the computer, and only the chosen gamble 
in this randomly selected trial would be played and resolved.
Task
Participants made decisions between pairs of gambles that yielded 
probabilistic monetary rewards while we simultaneously meas-
ured blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signals using 
functional MRI (fMRI). To induce intransitive choices, we used 
a modified version of a risky decision-making task developed by 
Tversky (1969). Each trial began with a white fixation cross (inter-
trial interval; ITI) of variable duration (mean length 1.72 s, range 
1.3–2.7 s), followed by the presentation of two gambles. In every 
trial, subjects had 4 s to indicate which of the two gambles they 
would prefer to play (Figure 1A). The difference between the actual 
response time and 4 s was added to the ITI, and failure to respond 
within 4 s resulted in a missed trial. After a response was made, 
the chosen gamble was enlarged for 500 ms to indicate that the 
response was registered by the computer. The gambles were not 
resolved during scanning, and participants were instructed that 
only one of the chosen gambles would be selected, played and paid 
out (in case of a win) at the end of the experiment. This enabled 
us to isolate neural responses related to gamble evaluation from 
direct outcome anticipation and experience, and examine brain 
activation related to the actual decision process.
The experiment consisted of 440 trials, divided across six runs. 
These trials comprised 200 experimental trials and 240 control tri-
als, randomly intermixed. In each experimental trial, two of five dif-
ferent gambles were presented. Each gamble offered a different gain 
magnitude (range $400 to $500) with a different probability (range 
p = 0.41–0.29; Figure 1B). All gambles differed in expected value (prod-
uct of probability and gain magnitude), which increased with increas-
ing probability (cf. Figure 1B). All 10 possible binary combinations of 
Figure 1 | (A) The event-related design. Each trial began with an intertrial interval 
(ITI) of variable duration, followed by the presentation of a pair of gambles. Each bar 
represents one gamble, which contained information about the potential monetary 
gain magnitude to be won by playing it (numbers at the bottom of the bars) and the 
probability of winning this money, as specified by the expanse covered by the 
green area in each bar. The $0 at the top of the bars indicated that participants 
would receive no money in case they did not win. In every trial, one of the 
presented gambles had a higher gain magnitude, but a lower winning probability 
(Gricher), and the other gamble had a lower magnitude, but a higher probability (Gsafer). 
Participants had 4 s to indicate which of the two gambles they would prefer to play. 
After making a decision, the selected gamble was enlarged for 500 ms. (B) 
Gambles used in the experiment. There were five different gambles that were 
presented in all ten possible pairwise combinations in a randomized fashion. The 
winning probability increased from gamble A to E in steps of 0.03, and the gain 
magnitude decreased from A to E in steps of $25, so that gambles with higher 
magnitudes had lower probabilities and vice versa. We used the minimum step-size 
of changes in probability (0.03) and gain magnitude ($25) to measure the 
gamble-distance in every presented gamble pair (see text for details).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  3
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transitive (no choice must be adjusted), a value of 1 means that a 
subject is perfectly intransitive (the maximum number of choices 
must be adjusted).
To generate a benchmark level of transitivity, we simulated 
choices in a random sample of 25,000 hypothetical subjects who 
performed the current task and implemented a rational, but error-
prone choice strategy. To obtain a benchmark level of intransitiv-
ity given rational decision makers, we measured the intransitivity 
index in all simulated subjects (see Supplementary Material). Since 
a significantly small proportion (<5%) of the simulated subjects 
had an intransitivity index score of >0.3, we opted for a detection 
threshold of 0.3 and classified every actual participant as transitive 
who had an intransitivity index score <0.3, and every participant 
as intransitive who had an index score >0.3.
Context-dependent desirability of the gambles
A participant making intransitive choices may prefer gamble A 
when paired with B, but not when paired with C. Hence, a putative 
cause for intransitivity is that a gamble is not evaluated independ-
ently: the desirability of gamble A may be variable and depending 
on the context, i.e., which other gamble it is paired with. To deter-
mine the relative context-dependent desirability (CDD) of each 
gamble in each gamble pair combination, we estimated the log 
odds of choosing a gamble as a function of which other gamble it 
was paired with. This provides an expedient way to estimate the 
leverage that each gamble pairing has on choosing a given gamble 
in that pair. Log odds were determined separately for every partici-
pant and every gamble combination with the following equation:
logitij
ij
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p
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|
|
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


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
 
(1)
where logiti|j indicates the log odds of choosing gamble i when 
paired with gamble j, pi|j indicates the probability of choosing gam-
ble i when paired with gamble j (approximated as the fraction of 
choices of gamble i), and pj|i stands for the probability of choosing 
gamble j when paired with i, with pi|j + pj|i = 1. logiti|j can be under-
stood as the leverage of the presence of gamble j on the choices of 
gamble i. Under the commonly made assumption that the relative 
number of choices of an option reflects its relative attractiveness 
(Herrnstein, 1961, 1970; Navarick and Fantino, 1972, 1975; Hey, 
1995; Kalenscher et al., 2003; Sugrue et al., 2004), logiti|j measures 
how much more (or less) attractive a given gamble is relative to 
the gamble it is paired with. logiti|j can hence be interpreted as 
the context-dependent desirability of gamble i relative to context 
gamble j. For every subject and every gamble in every combination, 
we computed logiti|j as a measure of CDD.
Gamble-distance as operationalization of context
To  investigate  how  the  local  gamble  pairing  (context)  affects 
choice, we conducted a more detailed analysis of our behavioral 
data. To characterize context, we examined preferences as a func-
tion of distance between gambles. Gamble-distance is a quantity 
the five gambles were presented 20 times each. In every trial, one of the 
presented gambles had a higher gain magnitude, but a lower winning 
probability (Gricher), and the other gamble had a lower magnitude, but 
a higher probability (Gsafer). The degree by which gains and probabili-
ties differed varied between gamble pairs and was characterized by 
gamble-distance (see below). 
In control trials, gambles were presented that differed only in 
probability, but not in gain magnitude (probability-controls; gain 
magnitude was random, but identical in both gambles), or only in 
magnitude, but not in probability (magnitude-controls; probabil-
ity was random, but identical in both gambles.). Probability- and 
gain-controls covered all levels of gains and probabilities of the 
experimental trials (Figure 1B), but in order to reduce the overall 
length of the experiment, we only included control gamble pairs in 
which the difference in gain magnitudes was either $25 (equivalent 
to distance 1) or $75 (equivalent to distance 3), or the difference in 
probabilities was p = 0.03 and 0.09 respectively.
Probability-  and  magnitude-control  trials  had  the  purpose 
to ensure that subjects could perceptually discriminate between 
small differences in probability or magnitude, to identify brain 
areas related to tracking differences in gains and probabilities, and 
to exclude subjects that made random decisions. All subjects con-
sistently and with no exception selected the more advantageous 
control gambles. Control trials were intermixed with experimental 
trials. The sequence of presentation of all trials was randomized 
within- and between-subjects, and the side of gamble presentation 
was likewise randomized across all trial repetitions.
BehavIORal aNalysIs
Detection of intransitive preferences
Where p(x,y) indicates the probability of choices for x over y, and 
p(a,b) ≥ 0.5 and p(b,c) ≥ 0.5, choice satisfies stochastic transitivity 
if p(a,c) ≥ 0.5. We used graph theory to detect violations of sto-
chastic transitivity in our subjects’ choices (Choi et al., 2007a,b). 
Choices between gambles were represented graphically which 
allows testing for acyclicity: preferred gambles were connected 
to non-preferred gambles by an arrow pointing in the direction 
of the unpreferred gamble. Indifferent gamble pairs were con-
nected by two arrows pointing in both directions. We deemed a 
gamble as preferred over another gamble if the preferred gamble 
was chosen in more than 60% of the presentations of that pair. 
Indifference between two gambles in a pair was assumed when 
one gamble was chosen in 40% or more and in 60% or less of the 
presentations of that pair.
Transitivity requires that such directed graph representations 
are acyclical. If there are one or more loops in the graph, we 
can conclude that the subject had one or more occurrences of 
intransitive choices. For example, if a subject prefers gamble A 
over B, and B over C, but C over A, the arrows will point from 
A → B → C and back from C → A, and hence form a loop between 
A, B and C. Real choice data often contain at least one violation 
of transitivity. It is therefore important to quantify the extent of 
intransitivity. We used an intransitivity index that measures, for 
each subject, the smallest possible amount by which the subject’s 
choices must be adjusted in order to remove all violations of tran-
sitivity, normalized to the maximum possible number of choices 
to be adjusted1. A value of 0 means that a subject is   perfectly 
1Our intransitivity score was inspired by Afriat’s (1972) critical cost efficiency 
index. Afriat’s index measures the amount of wealth a subject is missing out by 
making inconsistent choices. Unlike our index, in which higher scores indicate 
more inconsistent choices, an Afriat’s index score of 0 indicates maximum waste 
of wealth and a score of 1 indicates perfectly consistent choices.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  4
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It is a critical feature of the theory that probabilities and 
  magnitudes affect the decision differentially depending on the 
difference between the gamble attributes. In its extreme, if the dif-
ference in one attribute falls below the attribute-specific threshold, 
the weighting factor Φ will be 0, the attribute will be ignored, and 
the decision will be determined by the other attribute. Note that, 
here, small attribute weights cannot be explained by perceptual 
discrimination problems as all participants, without exception, 
could discriminate between small differences in probability and 
gain magnitude in the control trials (see below). The differential 
weighting of gain magnitudes and probabilities can be modeled 
by sigmoidal gain- and probability-  weighting functions that dif-
fer in shape and slope, as illustrated in Figure 2D. We refer to 
this model as the additive-difference model (Tversky, 1969). See 
Section ‘Results’ and Supplementary Material for a more compre-
hensive discussion of this model. Also, see Supplementary Results 
for the discussion of alternative theories of intransitive choice.
Modeling the magnitude- and probability-weighting functions
We aimed to express the priority attached to gain magnitude over 
probability as the difference in the magnitude- and probability-
weighting functions, and vice versa. To this end, we estimated 
for every subject individually the weighting   functions 

ΦProbability 
and

ΦMagnitude.  We  approximated  the  unweighted  [u(XProbability) 
− u(YProbability)] and [u(XMagnitude) − u(YMagnitude)] terms in Eq. 3 as 
the difference between the normalized probability and magnitude 
values. Because the unweighted differences in normalized prob-
abilities and gain magnitudes are equally spaced apart at all gamble-
distances, any shifts in preference are attributable to the peculiar 
differential slopes of the fitted functions 

ΦProbability and 

ΦMagnitude 
only (cf. Figure 2C). We assumed that the more weight a partici-
pant places on differences in probability, the more often she should 
choose the gamble with the higher probability, Gsafer, and, vice versa, 
the more weight she places on differences in gains, the more often 
she should choose Gricher. To obtain an estimate of the individual 
weighting functions for each individual participant, we fitted Eq. 3 
to the difference between their Gsafer- and Gricher-choices in every 
gamble pair with a least-square method. The individual weighting 
functions 

ΦMagnitude and 

ΦProbability had a sigmoidal shape:

Φi z ii i z =
+
=+ −
1
1e
with αβ ∆ ,
 
(4)
where αi and βi are the fitted parameters describing the horizontal 
positions and the slopes of the weighting functions of attribute i, and 
∆i is the normalized difference between gamble attributes in each 
pair. The lower bounds of βi were chosen to be 0 to ensure that the 
weighting functions increased with increasing attribute differences. 
See Figure 2D for illustration and Tables S1–S3 in Supplementary 
Material for the best fitting parameters for every participant.
 IMage aCqUIsITION
Functional  magnetic  resonance  images  were  collected  with  a 
Phillips Intera 3.0T at the university hospital of the University of 
Amsterdam using a standard six-channel SENSE head coil and a 
T2* sensitive gradient echo (EPI) sequence (96 × 96 matrix, rep-
etition time (TR) 2000 ms., echo time (TE) 30 ms, flip angle (FA) 
80º, 34 slices, 2.3 mm × 2.3 mm voxel size, 3-mm thick transverse 
that measures how different two gambles in a gamble pair are: the 
greater the difference in probability and magnitude, the greater 
the gamble-distance. For example, the gambles in the adjacent pair 
AB are only one step apart along the probability and magnitude 
scale (cf. Figure 1B), and therefore this pair is classified as gamble-
distance 1. Conversely, gambles in pair AD offer relatively different 
probabilities and magnitudes, and the pair is consequently clas-
sified as gamble-distance 3. In total, the gamble pairs used in the 
present experiment could be classified into four gamble-distances. 
We examined the proportion of selections of Gricher or Gsafer as a 
function of gamble-distance.
 Modeling individual decisions: the additive-difference model
Our behavioral analysis of distance-dependent choices (cf. results 
below and Figure 2C) showed that participants making intran-
sitive decisions preferred the gamble with the higher magni-
tude, Gricher, over the gamble with the higher probability, Gsafer, at 
gamble-distance 1, but the tendency to choose Gricher decreased 
linearly with gamble-distance until it reversed toward a prefer-
ence for Gsafer. Hence, our intransitive participants behaved as 
if they maximized gain magnitude at gamble-distance 1, but 
minimized risk at higher gamble-distances. Why are preferences 
for risky or safe gambles variable and distance-dependent? How 
is it possible that a gamble is not evaluated independently, but 
with respect to the alternative gamble presented? It is possible 
that agents do not consider the choice alternatives as an inte-
grated whole, but compare the probabilities and gain magnitudes 
between the two gambles separately (Tversky, 1969; Russo and 
Dosher, 1983; Brandstätter et al., 2006; but see Fishburn, 1982; 
Hey, 1995). According to this idea, an individual would prefer the 
safer gamble if she considered the difference in probabilities more 
important than the difference in magnitudes, and would prefer 
the richer gamble if she considered magnitudes more important 
than probabilities.
Based on this rationale, we modeled our participants’ decisions 
as follows (Tversky, 1969). X should be preferred over Y if
Φii ii i
i
n
uX uY () () − [] ≥
= ∑
1
0
 
(2)
where n is the number of attributes (here, two: gain magnitude 
and probability), [ui(Xi) − ui(Yi)] is the difference in the utility of 
attribute i between alternatives X and Y, and Φi is the weighting 
function that determines the impact of the difference in attribute 
i on the overall decision, that is, the subjective importance of gain 
magnitudes or probabilities for the decision. Hence, gamble X 
would be preferred over Y if
Φ
Φ
Pr Pr Pr obabilityo bability obability
Magnitude
uX uY () − () 


+
u uX uY MagnitudeM agnitude () − () 


 ≥0.
 
(3)
Note that in the present task weighted difference in the utilities of 
one attribute (e.g., magnitude) is effectively subtracted from the 
weighted difference in the other attribute (e.g., probability) because 
of the inverted signs of the differences in attributes between gambles 
X and Y: one gamble always had a relatively higher gain magnitude, 
the other had a relatively higher probability.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  5
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separate beta maps for all gamble pairs. This was done by   combining 
the event types of   interest from the base model (see above) accord-
ing to gamble pair, thus pooling over choices of Gricher and Gsafer. 
Next, we created individual parametric contrasts by weighting each 
gamble pair event type with the corresponding difference esti-
mates [

ΦΦ Magnitudeo bability − Pr ], or [

ΦΦ ProbabilityM agnitude − ], respec-
tively. All difference estimates were centered by means of Z-scoring 
[Z = (X − M)/SD, X is the raw value, M is the average of the function, 
SD the standard deviation and Z is the Z-scored value).To identify 
brain regions modulated by the priority given to gain magnitudes 
over probability, parametric modulation of the difference between  
ΦMagnitudeand 

ΦProbability in each gamble pair was used to search for 
correlated activation. To identify brain regions modulated by the 
priority given to probability over gain magnitudes, parametric 
modulation of the difference between 

ΦProbabilityand 

ΦMagnitude in 
each gamble pair was used to search for correlated activation.
The effects of interest were calculated relative to an implicit 
baseline (the jittered ITI between 1.3 and 2.7 s; mean duration 
1.72 s). Group averages were calculated for each regressor using 
random effects analyses. For each contrast, statistical parametric 
maps of the t-statistic were generated on a voxel-by-voxel basis, 
and these t-values were transformed into z-scores of the standard 
normal distribution. Because we were interested in neural cor-
relates of intransitivity, we restricted our fMRI analysis to the 
data from our intransitive subjects only, except where indicated 
otherwise (see below). Transitive subjects were included in the 
behavioral analyses, however. We refrained from comparing brain 
activations in intransitive with transitive participants because the 
small number of transitive participants did not allow a reliable 
between-subject comparison and ambiguity about the behavioral 
strategies used by the transitive participants (five subjects seemed 
to have maximized gain magnitude, four subjects appeared to have 
minimized risk and one subject made arbitrary decisions) would 
make the interpretation of between-subject analysis dubious. Brain 
data from transitive subjects shown in the figures is for illustrative 
purposes only and should be considered anecdotal evidence.
We further asked whether the propensity to make intransitive 
decisions modulates desirability-related brain activations. To this 
end, we entered the individual intransitivity index as a covariate at 
the second level and performed a whole-brain analysis to identify 
brain regions sensitive to the CDD scores and the intransitivity 
index. Because we were interested in the effect of the full spectrum 
of intransitivity on value-related brain activation, we also included 
data from transitive subjects in this analysis.
For all contrasts, we performed whole-brain analyses and report 
activations surviving a threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with 
a minimum cluster size of five voxels. Reported voxels conform to 
MNI coordinate space, with the right side of the image correspond-
ing to the right side of the brain.
Control trials
The analysis of the control trials was identical to the analysis of the 
experimental trials with the following exceptions. For the analysis of 
the control trials, we defined four event types of interest: Difference 
in gain magnitude 25, difference in gain magnitude 50, difference 
in probability 0.03 and difference in probability 0.09. The first two 
event types refer to the gain-control trials in which gambles   differed 
slices). Stimuli were projected on a screen at the front-end of the 
scanner and observed via a mirror mounted on the head coil. The 
participants’ heads were fixed by foam and they wore earplugs to 
reduce scanner noise. All stimuli were generated by a Pentium PC 
and presented using Eprime software (Psychology Tools Inc.). The 
behavioral responses were collected by an fMRI-compatible four-
button response box (Lumitouch™).
fMRI aNalysIs
Preprocessing  and  data  analysis  were  performed  using  SPM2 
software (Statistical Parametric Mapping; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm).  The  first  four  functional  scans  were  discarded  to 
allow for magnetic saturation. Time-series were corrected for dif-
ferences in acquisition time, and realigned with reference to the 
first image to correct for head motion. The images were spatially 
normalized  using  the  Montreal  Neurological  Institute  (MNI) 
EPI template included in SPM2 and resliced to a resolution of 
3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm. Functional images were normalized and 
spatially smoothed using an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8-mm at 
full width-half maximum.
Functional data were analyzed in an event-related design. Event-
related activity was assessed by convolving a vector of the trial onset 
times with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). 
Individual movement parameters and scanner drift were modeled 
as covariates of no interest. A high-pass filter with a cutoff period 
of 128 s was used to remove low-frequency noise. A general lin-
ear model (GLM) served to compute trial-type-specific betas that 
reflected the strength of covariance between the brain activation 
and the canonical response function for a given condition at each 
voxel for each participant (Friston et al., 1995).
Experimental trials
For the analysis of the experimental trials, we defined 20 event types 
of interest: selections of either gamble in each of the 10 gamble pairs. 
That is, for each pair of gambles x and y, we modeled choices of 
gamble x and choices of gamble y separately. Our analysis targeted 
BOLD signal changes during gamble evaluation, which started at 
stimulus onset (onset of gamble presentation). All parameter esti-
mates reported in this paper are taken from this model.
Regions encoding the CDD of the chosen gamble were identified 
by first assessing the CDD values for each chosen gamble in each 
gamble pair and for every individual participant as described above. 
Then, we created individual parametric contrasts by weighting each 
event type (choices of each gamble in each pair) with the individual 
CDD estimates corresponding to the chosen gamble in each pair. 
All individual CDD values were centered by means of Z-scoring 
[Z = (X − M)/SD, X is the raw value, M is the average of the function, 
SD the standard deviation and Z is the Z-scored value]. We then 
used parametric modulation of the CDD of the chosen gamble to 
search for monotonic increases or decreases in activation.
Regions encoding the positive or negative difference between  
ΦMagnitude and 

ΦProbability (as an approximation of the priority attached 
to one attribute over another) were identified by, first, estimat-
ing the weighting functions 

ΦMagnitudes and 

ΦProbability for every par-
ticipant individually as described above. We thus obtained two 
individual  weight-difference  estimates  ([

ΦΦ Magnitudeo bability − Pr  
and 

ΦΦ ProbabilityM agnitude − ]) for each gamble pair. Then, we   created Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  6
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gamble B over C in 80% of BC presentations, but chose A in only 
5% of AC presentations even though A should be strongly preferred 
over C according to transitivity. This pattern goes on: while gamble 
B was revealed preferred over C (B was chosen in 80% of BC pres-
entations) and C was revealed preferred over D (90%), B was not 
preferred over D (11%); likewise, although C was preferred over 
D (90%) and D was preferred over E (85%), C was not preferred 
over E (25%).
We  calculated  an  intransitivity  index  for  each  subject  as 
described above. Across all subjects, the index ranged from 0 to 0.7 
(cf. Figure 2B for a distribution of indices). According to our bench-
mark level of transitivity (see above and Supplementary Material), 
we classified participants as transitive if they scored lower than 
only in gain magnitude (probability was chosen randomly, but 
kept constant across both presented gambles), the latter two event 
types refer to the probability control trials in which gambles dif-
fered only in probability (gain magnitude was chosen randomly, 
but kept constant across both presented gambles). We contrasted 
high- and low-gain and high- and low-probability control trials to 
search for differences in neural activation.
ResUlTs
BehavIOR: ChOICes weRe sysTeMaTICally INTRaNsITIve
Participants exhibited clear, systematic and predictable intransitive 
choices in many instances. For example, one participant selected 
gamble A over gamble B in 100% of AB presentations, and chose 
Figure 2 | (A) Choices in all possible combinations of sets with three gambles 
in intransitive participants. Diamonds represent the mean percentage of choices 
of one gamble over another (±standard error of the mean) (***p < 0.0001). For 
reasons of simplicity, only gamble sets involving three gambles are shown here 
(e.g., gamble set ABC or CDE) and sets including more gambles are not 
displayed, although they were included in the analysis (cf. SI for a complete 
coverage). Gamble number 1 is a placeholder for the first gamble in any given 
gamble set (e.g., gamble A in gamble set ABC, or C in gamble set CDE), and 
gamble numbers 2 and 3 represent the second and third gambles respectively 
(e.g., B and C in gamble set ABC). The choices displayed were averaged across 
choices in all combinations of gamble triplets, they were not preselected for 
intransitivity. (B) Histogram of the distribution of intransitivity indices. The 
light-gray bars indicate the number of participants classified as transitive, the 
dark gray bars indicate intransitive participants. (C) Percentage of choices of the 
gamble yielding the relatively higher gain magnitude (Gricher) in intransitive (black 
line) and transitive (gray line) participants as a function of gamble-distance (mean 
values ± SEM). At gamble-distance 1, intransitive participants clearly preferred 
Gricher over Gsafer, but preference reversed with higher gamble-distances 
(p < 0.0001). Preference for Gricher or Gsafer was less distance-dependent in 
transitive subjects. (D) Sigmoidal weighting-functions can explain the 
context-dependent shift from preferring richer to safer gambles (cf. C). The 
weighting functions for probabilities (ΦProbability, black line) and magnitudes 
(ΦMagnitude, gray line) cross because of their presumed different shapes. As a 
consequence, ΦMagnitude is higher than ΦProbability when the difference in 
magnitudes and probabilities is minute, e.g., at a small gamble-distance (cf. left 
gamble pair). However, when the difference in both attributes increases (greater 
gamble-distance, right gamble pair), the weights reverse and ΦProbability is larger 
than ΦMagnitude. Accordingly, at gamble-distance 1 (illustrated by the left gamble 
pair in Figure 2D), decisions should be more strongly influenced by magnitudes 
than by probabilities, and individuals should have a higher propensity to choose 
the gamble with the higher magnitude (Gricher). Conversely, at higher distances 
(e.g., the right gamble pair), decisions should be more strongly influenced by 
probabilities than by magnitudes, and individuals should be more likely to choose 
the gamble with the higher probability (Gsafer).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  7
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activity correlates with CDD will also exhibit   intransitive activation 
patterns, suggesting that the neural value code in these regions was 
not represented on an ordinal or higher scale. An analysis of activ-
ity in DLPFC, PPC, striatum, VMPFC and MPFC illustrates this 
implication. Figure 4 shows the difference in activation to choices of 
gamble x relative to choices of y in gamble pair xy in these structures, 
based on the mean signal in the activated voxels in the cluster identi-
fied by our parametric contrast analysis presented above: For every 
intransitive subject and every trial type, we extracted the activations 
in the identified clusters in the respective identified brain regions 
(remember that we had 20 trial types: choices of every gamble in 
each gamble pair were modeled separately). We then subtracted 
the activations during choices of one gamble from the activations 
during choices of the other gamble in each pair. Next, we averaged 
the resulting activation-difference values across all subjects and pos-
sible triplet combinations (remember that triplet combinations are 
any combinations involving three gambles, for example, choices in 
gamble pairs AB, BC and AC, or choices in CD, DE and DE). The 
bars shown in Figure 4 hence show the average difference in activa-
tion to choices of gamble x relative to choice of gamble y in gamble 
pair xy, i.e, how much more (or less) active a brain region was to 
choices of gamble x relative to choices of gamble y.
A neural value signal on ordinal or higher scale should satisfy 
transitivity: if activation was higher in response to choices of gam-
ble 1 compared to choices of gamble 2 in gamble pairs 1 vs 2 (1 > 2), 
and activation to choices of gamble 2 was likewise higher relative 
to choices of 3 (2 > 3), then the signal would satisfy transitivity if it 
was also higher to choices of gamble 1 relative to choices of gamble 
3 (1 > 3). Activation in DLPFC, PPC and putamen (Figures 4A–C) 
0.3 on our intransitivity index (light-gray bars in Figure 2B), and 
classified them as intransitive if they scored higher than 0.3 (dark 
gray bars in Figure 2B). This classification coincides well with visual 
inspection of the distribution of intransitivity scores (Figure 2B) 
which suggests that there were two groups of subjects: one transi-
tive group with zero or near-zero intransitivity indices, and another 
intransitive group with non-zero indices. In total, 17 out of the 27 
included participants met this intransitivity criterion.
NeUROIMagINg: BRaIN RegIONs TRaCkINg The CONTexT-
DePeNDeNT DesIRaBIlITy Of gaMBles
We asked whether there is evidence for intransitive neural repre-
sentations of the gambles’ local desirabilities. The participant in 
the example above preferred gamble A when paired with B, but 
not when paired with C, implying that the desirability of gamble 
A was variable and depended on which other gamble it was paired 
with. We hypothesized that such context-dependent values were 
encoded in brain areas that have been previously linked to decision-
making and value representation. To examine this possibility, in 
line with previous studies (Kalenscher et al., 2005; Padoa-Schioppa 
and Assad, 2006, 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Plassmann et al., 
2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008), we defined brain areas as 
related to a gamble’s desirability if their activity correlated with 
the individual propensity to choose that gamble over another. To 
quantify the effect of context on desirability, we determined for 
every gamble the log odds of choosing that gamble given the other 
gamble it was paired with (Eq. 1; see Materials and Methods). We 
determined the individual CDDs of all gambles in all pairs, and for 
all intransitive participants separately. Parametric analysis revealed 
that BOLD responses in, among others, DLPFC, PPC and puta-
men were positively correlated with the CDD of the chosen gamble 
(Figure 3 and Table S4 in Supplementary Material). These areas are 
key structures in decision-making (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Paulus 
et al., 2001; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; Ernst 
and Paulus, 2005; Plassmann et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007, 2009; 
Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Kim et al., 2008; Pesaran et al., 2008) and 
have been associated with planning, cognitive control, rational rea-
soning (Miller and Cohen, 2001; McClure et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 
2004; Hare et al., 2009) and representation of risk-attitude depend-
ent subjective value (Tobler et al., 2007, 2009). On the other hand, 
activations in several areas, incl. medial prefrontal cortex (MFPC) 
and VMPFC were negatively correlated with CDD (Figure 3B and 
Table S4 in Supplementary Material), suggesting that activation in 
these regions decreased with increasing context-dependent desir-
ability. The latter result is somewhat surprising because activity in 
these areas has been repeatedly shown to positively correlate with 
the subjective value of the expected outcome of a decision (Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 
2008, 2009; Rangel et al., 2008).
NeURal valUe sIgNals aRe INTRaNsITIve
As outlined above, it is often assumed that one commodity cannot 
be at the same time better and worse than another commodity. 
Hence, subjective values should be represented at least on an ordinal 
scale that allows for unique ranking of options. However, the local, 
context-dependent desirabilities of the gambles in the present study 
followed an intransitive pattern. Hence, any brain regions whose 
Figure 3 | Areas whose activity was positively or negatively correlated 
with the context-dependent desirability (CDD) of the chosen gamble. The 
CDD quantified the subjective desirability of a gamble, given the other gamble 
presented, and was defined as the log odds of choosing gamble X when 
paired with gamble Y. (A) Activity in DLPFC (peak at MNI coordinates: −42, 
36, 27), posterior parietal cortex (−21, −81, 48) and putamen (−33, −3, 0) were 
positively correlated with CDD, (B) activity in ventromedial (−6, 27 , −12) and 
medial prefrontal cortex (9, 51, 15) was negatively correlated with CDD. 
Threshold p < 0.001, minimum five voxels.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  8
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tum (caudate) and bilateral   anterior   cingulate cortex (Figure 5 and 
Table S5 in Supplementary Material). We found negative correlations 
in bilateral middle temporal gyrus. Figure 5 illustrates that activation 
in these regions increased with increasing intransitivity index.
BehavIORal PRefeReNCe fOR RelaTIvely safeR OR RICheR gaMBles 
DePeNDs ON The DIffeReNCe BeTweeN The TwO OffeReD gaMBles
Next, we performed an additional behavioral analysis in which we 
asked whether choices for the richer or the safer gamble depended 
on gamble-distance. The analysis of distance-dependent choices 
(Figure 2C) showed that participants making intransitive decisions 
preferred the gamble with the higher magnitude, Gricher, over the 
gamble with the higher probability, Gsafer, at gamble-distance 1, but 
the tendency to choose Gricher decreased linearly with gamble-dis-
tance until it reversed toward a preference for Gsafer [F(75,3) = 30.9, 
p < 0.0001, analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures]. 
Transitive individuals showed a significantly lower degree of dis-
tance-dependency [group interaction, F(75,3) = 14.3, p < 0.0001].
INTRaNsITIve DeCIsION RUles
Why did the intransitive subjects tend to select the richer gamble 
when the difference between the gambles’ attributes was minute, 
but selected the safer gamble when the difference between their 
did not meet this criterion: Despite positive activation differences 
to choices of gamble 1 relative to 2, and 2 relative to 3 (suggesting 
that 1 > 2 and 2 > 3), activation was negative to choices of gam-
ble 1 relative to 3 (1 < 3). Figures 4D,E depict that VMPFC and 
MFPC inversely mirrored DLPFC and PPC activation, and hence 
equally failed to satisfy transitivity, although with a reversed sign. 
We conclude that, in the current task, the neural desirability-signals 
were not consistent with the assumption of an independent and 
ordinal-scaled neural representation of value, but instead reflected 
the intransitive fluctuations in preference-rank of a given gamble 
depending on which other gamble it was paired with.
Next, we asked if activity in value-coding regions was modulated 
by the individual propensity to make intransitive decisions. To this 
end, we used trial-by-trial CDD scores as a parametric modulator of 
the regressors, and the individual intransitivity indices as a subject-
by-subject regressor at the second level, and then performed a whole-
brain analysis. Different to the other analyses of fMRI results reported 
in this article, here, we also included data from transitive subjects 
because we were interested in the effect of the full spectrum of intran-
sitivity on brain activation. However, the same analysis restricted 
to data from intransitive subjects yielded similar results. We found 
positive correlations between activity in CDD-coding regions and 
intransitivity indices in, among others, left DLPFC, bilateral stria-
Figure 4 | Activation in desirability-coding brain structures. The graph 
shows mean activity (±SEM) in the regions shown in Figure 3, averaged across 
all triplet gamble sets. The bars represent the difference in BOLD activation to 
choices of gamble x relative to choice of gamble y in gamble pair xy, i.e., how 
much more (or less) active a brain region was in response to choices of gamble x 
relative to choices of gamble y. Gamble numbers 1, 2 and 3 are placeholders for 
the first, second and third gamble in a given gamble set (cf. legend of Figure 2A). 
Insets show the activity in transitive subjects. Note that data from transitive 
subjects were not considered in the fMRI analysis and are merely shown here as 
supporting anecdotal evidence only (see text for details). (A–C) Brain regions in 
which activity was positively correlated with relative desirability. (D,e) Brain 
regions in which activity was negatively correlated with relative desirability.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  9
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ΦProbability < ΦMagnitude for small gamble-distances  (5)
and
ΦProbability > ΦMagnitude for large gamble-distances  (6)
with ΦAttribute referring to the weighting functions of the difference in 
gain magnitude, or probability respectively. Hence, we hypothesized that 
the distance-dependent shift between preferring richer or safer gambles 
is a consequence of the balance between the individual weighting func-
tions ΦProbability and ΦMagnitude (cf. Figure 2D for illustration). To test this 
hypothesis, we modeled our participants’ decisions using Eq. 2 and esti-
mated the individual, distance-dependent weighting functions 

ΦMagnitude 
and 

ΦProbability for every subject separately, as described in Eq. 4.
INsUla aND POsTeRIOR CINgUlaTe aRe seNsITIve TO The DIsTaNCe-
DePeNDeNT PRIORITy gIveN TO gaINs OR PROBaBIlITIes
Is there evidence for a neural underpinning of the decision rules lead-
ing to context-dependent fluctuations in gamble-desirability, and 
hence intransitivity? We hypothesized that brain regions sensitive to 
the variable priority given to gains over probabilities (and vice versa) 
attributes  was  large  (Figure 2C)? As  mentioned,  it  is  possible 
that intransitive agents do not consider the choice alternatives 
as an integrated whole, but compare the probabilities and gain 
magnitudes between the two gambles separately (Tversky, 1969; 
Russo and Dosher, 1983; Brandstätter et al., 2006). An individual 
would prefer the safer gamble if she considered the difference in 
probabilities more important than the difference in magnitudes, 
and would prefer the richer gamble if she considered magnitudes 
more important than probabilities. Consistent with this idea (cf. 
Eq. 2), our participants’ shift in tendency to prefer richer gambles 
at small distances to safer gambles at high distances indicates that 
the importance of gains relative to probabilities changed across 
gamble-distance. Because the objective difference in gains and 
probabilities incremented evenly with every step along the distance-
scale (cf. Figure 1B), the distance-dependent change in preference 
cannot be attributed to variation in the objective magnitude- and 
probability-measures. Instead, according to Eq. 3 the shift is the 
consequence of subjective, differential and distance-dependent 
weighting functions which satisfy:
Figure 5 | relation of CDD-related activations to individual intransitivity 
indices. Activations in brain regions covarying with CDD values and individual 
intransitivity scores in (A) DLPFC (peak at −45, 24, 33), (B) bilateral striatum 
(caudate, −12, 0, 18 and 9, 0 15) and (C) anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; 3, 18, 
27). In the scatter plots, the peak activations in the identified regions of individual 
participants are regressed against their intransitivity index.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  10
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Material) which has been shown to play a role in representing 
subjective value (Kable and Glimcher, 2007), and incorporating 
individual risk attitude into reward preference (McCoy and Platt, 
2005). Figure 6B illustrates that activation in PCC was also highly 
distance-  dependent: PCC was minimally recruited at gamble-dis-
tance 1, where the importance of probability for the decision was 
smallest, but its engagement increased with distance in proportion 
to the increasing priority given to probability. Taken together, these 
results suggest that insula encoded the context-dependent priority 
given to gains over probabilities, and PCC represented the priority 
given to probabilities over gains. A replication of the analysis with 
ΦMagnitude and ΦProbability modeled as linear instead of sigmoid func-
tions revealed nearly identical brain activation patterns.
DO INsUla aND PCC eNCODe The OBjeCTIve DIffeReNCe IN gaIN 
MagNITUDe aND PROBaBIlITy?
In the present task design, gamble-distance was not confounded 
with gain magnitudes or probabilities of the presented gambles, 
or the average gains or probabilities across gambles, or the gam-
bles’ expected values, or even the amount of red or green on the 
screen. Hence, it is unlikely that the distance-dependent activation 
should correlate with the difference between ΦMagnitude and ΦProbability. To 
isolate such regions, we performed a parametric analysis of the effect 
of the difference between the individually estimated 

ΦMagnitudeand  
ΦProbability on brain activation to identify structures that are sensitive 
to the priority given to gain magnitudes over probabilities. Likewise, 
the difference between 

ΦProbability and

ΦMagnitude was used to reveal areas 
sensitive to the priority given to probabilities over gains.
The parametric analysis of the context-dependent difference 
between 

ΦMagnitude and 

ΦProbability revealed activation in right pos-
terior insula which has been previously associated with choices of 
larger, but riskier (Huettel et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2009; Xue et al., 
2009) or larger, but delayed rewards (Tanaka et al., 2004; Wittmann 
et al., 2007) (Table S6 in Supplementary Material). Figure 6A 
shows that activation in insula was strongly distance-dependent: 
engagement was maximal at gamble-distance 1, where intransitive 
participants gave highest priority to gains, and decreased across 
gamble-distance in conjunction with the decreasing importance 
of gain magnitude for the decision.
The inverse analysis further revealed that the difference between  
ΦProbabilityand 

ΦMagnitude  modulated  activation  in,  among  others, 
posterior  cingulate  cortex  (PCC;  Table  S6  in  Supplementary 
Figure 6 | Areas sensitive to the difference between the individual 
weighting functions. Activity in these areas was positively or negatively 
modulated by gamble-distance. (A) Right insula (peak at 33, −9, 18) encoded the 
difference between magnitude- and probability-weighting functions, and thus the 
priority given to gain magnitude over probability. The graphs on the right of panel 
(A) show the mean activity of the activated voxels (±SEM). Activation was 
maximal at gamble-distance 1 (x-axis) and decreased with increasing gamble-
distance in the intransitive participants, but not transitive participants (small 
insets). (B) Posterior cingulate (−3, −39, 21) was sensitive to the difference 
between probability- and magnitude-weighting functions and thus to the priority 
given to probability over gain. Activation increased as a function of 
gamble-distance in the intransitive, but not the transitive participants (small inset).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  11
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on choice indicated that intransitivities were the consequence of 
participants giving variable priority to gain magnitudes or prob-
abilities, depending on the combination of the choice alternatives. 
Specifically, they had a strong propensity to select the richer gamble 
when the difference between the gambles’ attributes was minute, but 
tended to select the safer gamble when the difference between their 
attributes was large. We found that activity in posterior insula and 
PCC reflected the difference between the individual and variable 
priority attached to gain magnitude and probability during the 
decision, and thus correlated with the context-dependent priority 
given to the different attributes during a decision.
Our finding of local desirability-coding in decision networks 
is not only consistent with numerous neurobiological results in 
humans (Knoch et al., 2006; Fecteau et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007, 
2009), but is also in line with several electrophysiological studies 
showing that the subjective reward value during risky or intertem-
poral decision-making is represented by single neurons in DLPFC 
(Kim et al., 2008) and parietal cortex (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; 
Sugrue et al., 2004). Importantly, our main findings also amend 
recent claims about neural value coding (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; 
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; 
Plassmann et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007, 2009; Elliott et al., 2008; 
Hare et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008) with the notion that represen-
tations of the desirability of a given commodity can depend also on 
which other commodities are available in a choice set. This latter 
finding is particularly noteworthy because it suggests that, at least 
in the present task, decision-related activation in DLPFC, VMPFC, 
PPC and other traditional choice regions did not encode the ordi-
nal-scaled subjective value of a choice option, as would be expected 
from utility representation in the classic economic sense, but cor-
related with an option’s local, context-dependent and intransitive 
desirability. This discovery converges with recent evidence suggest-
ing that neural value signals are not absolute, but scaled relative to 
a contextual reference point (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Coricelli 
et al., 2005; Elliott et al., 2008; De Martino et al., 2009; Hardin 
et al., 2009; but see Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008). It is 
therefore tempting to speculate that intransitive choices are not 
the consequence of a noisy implementation of independent and 
hierarchically organized preferences (Hey, 1995), but may reflect 
truly context-dependent, intransitive valuation. This view is cor-
roborated by the fact that activity in several value-coding brain 
regions incl. DLPFC and striatum, correlated with the individual 
degree in the propensity to make intransitive decisions.
Our identification of brain regions encoding local desirability 
was based on the assumption that their activity reflected the con-
text-dependent value of the chosen gamble. Hence, when a partici-
pant selected a generally unpreferred gamble with a consequently 
low local desirability, we assumed that neural activity reflected this 
low desirability. However, it is possible that a participant transiently 
preferred the selected gamble even though he generally disfavored 
this gamble. If that was the case, the rationale underlying our search 
for neural regions correlating with the local desirability of gambles 
would have to be called into question. However, we consider this 
possibility unlikely. It is a literally undisputed supposition in eco-
nomics and psychology that individuals make errors when making 
decisions, that is, they occasionally select the actually unpreferred 
option. The propensity to make errors increases with increasing 
in insula and/or PCC reflected any of these parameters. However, 
gamble-distance by definition correlated with the objective differ-
ence in gain magnitude or probability between the gambles. This 
is innate in this measure as gamble-distance is a quantification 
of the difference in the presented gambles’ attributes. Hence, the 
neural activation reported here may either be a correlate of the 
difference in the subjective importance attached to gain magni-
tudes and probabilities, or alternatively, they may merely track the 
objective difference in these attributes. To address this possibility, 
we analyzed the control trials. In half of the control trials, the two 
gambles presented in a given trial differed only in gain magnitude, 
but not in probability (gain-controls). In the other half, the gambles 
differed only in probability, but not in gain magnitude (probability-
controls). Hence, the objective difference between gain magnitude 
and probability was manipulated in the control-trials analogously 
to the experimental trials. However, in the control trials, there 
was no need to differentially weigh the difference in the gambles’ 
attributes: Because the gambles differed in only one attribute, this 
attribute was automatically decisive, and a trade-off and differential 
weighting of gain and probability was not necessary.
If  insula  and  PCC  indeed  tracked  the  objective  difference 
between probability and/or gain magnitude in the experimental 
trials, but not the subjective priorities given to the gamble attributes, 
these areas should also track the difference in probability in the 
probability-control trials, and/or they should track the difference in 
gains in the gain-control trials. Alternatively, if these regions indeed 
encoded the subjective priority given to gains and probabilities, as 
hypothesized, then these regions should show distance-dependent 
activation in the experimental trials, where weighting of attributes 
was necessary to reach a decision, but not in the control trials, where 
weighting was not necessary.
Paired t-tests revealed that activation in neither insula nor PCC 
significantly discriminated between difference in gain or prob-
ability in the control trials (all p > 0.22). Furthermore, a con-
junction analysis revealed that neither insula nor PCC overlapped 
with regions sensitive to the difference in gains or probabilities 
in the control-trials, even at very liberal thresholds (all p > 0.8; 
small volume correction). Several further alternative interpre-
tations of the insula- and PCC-activations are addressed in the 
Supplementary Material.
DIsCUssION
We studied the neural correlates of intransitive decisions while 
participants performed a two-alternative choice task. Our results 
suggest that intransitive decisions occurred because participants did 
not assess the desirability of a given choice alternative independ-
ently, but with respect to the other alternative present. We found 
that activity in key regions for decision-making and value represen-
tation, incl. DLPFC,VMPFC, PPC and striatum (putamen) (Kim 
and Shadlen, 1999; Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; 
Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Hare et al., 2008, 2009; Kim et al., 2008; 
Pesaran et al., 2008; Pessoa, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Hardin et al., 
2009; Tobler et al., 2009) correlated with the context-dependent, 
intransitive desirability of the chosen gamble. We further found 
that neural value-codes in DLPFC, striatum (caudate) and ACC 
were modulated by the individual propensity to make intransi-
tive choices. A detailed behavioral analysis of the effect of context Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 49  |  12
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the two gambles separately and choose the safer gamble if they 
place higher priority on probability, or choose the richer gamble 
if they place higher priority on gain magnitude (Tversky, 1969; 
Russo and Dosher, 1983; Brandstätter et al., 2006). Consistent with 
this idea, our behavioral findings suggest that intransitive choices 
were due to a context-dependent shift in the weight attached to 
gains or  probabilities during  the  computation  of the  context-
dependent desirabilities.
Insula and PCC tracked the local, variable and context-de-
pendent importance of gains and probabilities for the decision. 
The PCC’s putative function in integrating aversion against low 
probabilities into the decision process is consistent with its docu-
mented role in reflecting risk attitude (McCoy and Platt, 2005). 
Likewise, the finding that insula activation correlated with the 
subjective decision-weight attached to gain magnitude is in line 
with previous experiments showing that insula is recruited when 
choosing larger, but riskier (Huettel et al., 2006; Smith et al., 
2009; Xue et al., 2009) or larger, but delayed rewards (Tanaka 
et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2007). However, at first glance, this 
interpretation might seem at variance with the insula’s docu-
mented role in arousal and pain (Ploghaus et al., 1999; Koyama 
et al., 2005). To reconcile the diverging opinions on the role of 
insula in pain processing and decision-making, it has recently 
been proposed that insular cortex may mediate sensitivity to 
homeostatic body signals (Craig, 2002; Weller et al., 2009; Xue 
et al., 2009). Because it is recruited by salient events, insula activa-
tion may signal the arousal associated with strong physiological 
changes, such as the anticipation of pain, but also the excite-
ment associated with high rewards during gambling (Li et al., 
2009; Xue et al., 2009). This suggests that insula may be crucial 
for integrating the urge to seek high rewards into the decision 
process, and thus modulate decisions according to the subjective 
priority placed on rewards.
Our results have general implications for our understanding 
of the neurobiological mechanisms of decision-making. We often 
make decisions between qualitatively different alternatives that are 
not straightforwardly comparable, such as whether to eat apples 
or oranges for dessert, or which financially risky prospect to invest 
in. One solution to the problem how we evaluate such diverse 
alternatives proposes that we assign subjective values (‘utilities’) 
to the available choice options. Encoding choice options as subjec-
tive values allows representing different commodities on a com-
mon scale, and therefore rank-ordering and comparing otherwise 
incommensurable  outcomes  (Bernoulli,  1954;  Shizgal,  1997; 
Montague and Berns, 2002). Rank-ordering requires that values 
are mentally represented at least on an ordinal scale (Samuelson, 
1938). This implies that one choice alternative cannot be at the 
same time better and worse than another alternative. If this was 
always true, then choices should at all times be transitive (but see 
Fishburn, 1982; Hey, 1995). Consequently, the failure to choose 
according to a hierarchically ordered, ordinal-scaled value system 
would be classified as irrational action in behavioral ecology and 
classic philosophic and economic theory (Samuelson, 1938; von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Afriat, 1967; Hume et al., 1978; 
Varian, 1982; Stephens and Krebs, 1986). Recent philosophical 
contributions call this conception of irrationality into question 
and ask whether it actually is possible to act against what one 
difference in the options’ values (Hey, 1995; see Supplementary 
Material). Because of errors when implementing subjective val-
ues during option selection, a value signal in the brain should not 
correlate with choice, but with the choice-underlying value of the 
chosen option, (Louie and Glimcher, 2010) which in the present 
case happens to be local and context-dependent. Hence, the BOLD 
response associated with selecting the actually unpreferred option 
should reflect the low value of that option.
Interestingly, activations in prefrontal regions that have been 
previously linked to processing goal values – the subjective val-
ues of expected choice outcomes – including medial and ventro-
medial prefrontal areas (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; 
Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008) were negatively correlated 
with context-dependent desirability in our intransitive subjects. 
This may point toward dissociable functions of lateral and medial 
prefrontal areas in context-dependent value-based decision-mak-
ing. Networks consisting of DLPFC and parietal cortex are often 
associated with the planning and reasoning aspects of decision-
making and cognitive control, whereas the affective components 
driving a decision are frequently attributed to medial prefrontal and 
orbitofrontal regions (Miller and Cohen, 2001; McClure et al., 2004; 
Tanaka et al., 2004; Hare et al., 2009; cf. however Pessoa, 2008). The 
prominent correlation between DLPFC/PPC activation and local 
desirability of the chosen gamble may hence suggest that context-
dependent valuation was supported by a more cognitive control 
mechanism rather than an affective process. This view is supported 
by the fact that activation in ACC, which is often associated with 
supervisory cognitive control and action monitoring (Carter et al., 
1998; Schall et al., 2002; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) correlated posi-
tively with the participants’ tendency to make intransitive decisions. 
However, this interpretation does not account for the conspicu-
ous anticorrelation between VMPFC activation and local desir-
ability of the chosen gamble. Several studies showed that VMPFC 
is recruited during counterfactual thinking – the comparison of 
the obtained outcome with the outcome the decision maker would 
have obtained had she chosen the other alternative (Camille et al., 
2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; Fujiwara 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, a recent study suggested that frontopolar 
cortex tracks the relative advantage of the foregone alternative in a 
risky choice task (Boorman et al., 2009). In the present task, when 
subjects assessed the value of a gamble, the alternative gamble had 
leverage on the local desirability of the evaluated gamble. Hence, 
participants  considered  the  alternative  gamble  during  gamble 
evaluation. Given the aforementioned role of medial prefrontal 
regions in counterfactual comparisons, it is therefore possible that 
VMPFC and MPFC tracked the local desirability of the unchosen 
gamble. Future research needs to test this possibility, and needs to 
determine when and why medial prefrontal regions encode goal 
values or the value of the alternative course of action. In summary, 
we propose that context-dependent valuation in the present task is 
supported by a cognitive mechanism residing in lateral prefrontal 
and posterior parietal regions, but is modulated by a counterfactual 
comparison process involving medial prefrontal regions.
Decisions under risk are complex, computationally demanding 
and error prone. It is therefore likely that decision makers use par-
ticular decision rules to simplify the choice problem. For example, 
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